On negation, truth and warranted assertibility
The Disquotational Schema for the truth predicate T is:
(DS) 'P' is T if and only if P All parties to the proceedings that follow concur with DS. The question is whether there is anything more to truth than can be gleaned from DS alone. Deflationism holds that there is nothing more to truth than this. Now it would appear that 'warrantedly assertible' can play the role of T in DS. Hence it would appear that the deflationist would be able to identify truth with warranted assertibility.
Crispin Wright is unhappy at this prospect; he will not let one have one's truth predicate and merely disquote with it. In his Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) he gives an argument for an important conclusion:
(C) truth and warranted assertibility, while normatively coincident, are potentially extensionally divergent.
If this conclusion (C) is correct, then, as he says, deflationism cannot be the correct account of truth. The premisses of Wright's argument are true; but the conclusion is false. In this note I locate the fallacy.
Wright (B) and (DS)to (C).Then we shall be able to pinpoint its fallacious step.
(B)guarantees that whenever 'P' is an appropriate substituend in (DS), so too is 'it is not the case that P'. So, says Wright, we have (i) 'not-P' is T if and only if not-P From 'P iff Q' it follows that 'not-P iff not-Q'. Thus from (DS) it follows that (ii) not-('P' is T) if and only if not-P From (i) and (ii) it follows that (iii) 'not-P' is T if and only if not-('P' is T ) So Wright accepts (iii) for the truth predicate T. What, then, is his complaint about our construing 'is T' as 'is warrantedly assertible'? It is that (iii) must allegedly fail, right-to-left, on such a construal. Wright is complaining, that is, that the inference
is invalid when 'T' is construed as 'warrantedly assertible'.
How so? According to Wright, the inference fails for any statement for which a state of information may be neutral. Such a state of information would justify neither the assertion nor the denial of the statement in question:
.. . with respect to such a state of information, and such a statement P, it will be correct to report that it is not the case that P is warrantedly assertible but incorrect to report that the negation of P is warrantedly assertible. (p. 20) In Discussion Note 3 at the end of Chapter 1, Wright considers the objection that one might block his argument by 'tampering with the ordinary logic of negation'. He replies that
The step that has to be blocked is that from the DS to [(ii) not-('P' is T) if and only if not-PI which is an instance of the principle whose validity depends only on that of modus tollens -ultimately reductio ad absurdum -and conditional proof. The claim will therefore have to be that these absolutely basic and intuitive principles, uncontested in both classical and intuitionistic sentential logic, are nevertheless implicitly at odds with the correct -deflationist -understanding of the concept of truth. (p. 32) This reply is mistaken. The step that has to be blocked ...? The very form of words beguiles the reader into not looking for the main fault elsewhere. And indeed the fault does lie elsewhere. It has to do with one's understanding of negation (and denial). To see this, let us isolate just the strand of the argument that Wright is exploiting in order to clinch his conclusion. The overall passage to which Wright is objecting (when 'is T' is construed as 'is warrantedly assertible') is:
With a little more detail supplied, we obtain the little proof n:
The proof l 3 has the single undischarged assumption not-('P' is T) and the conclusion 'not-P' is T.
Wright's objection is that if we construe 'T' as 'is warrantedly assertible' then (for some P) it could be 'correct to report' that not-('P' is WA) while yet it not be 'correct to report' that 'not-P' is WA. Now I take it that it is correct to report that P just in case P is warrantedly assertible. (This is Wright's assumption (A), with 'T' construed as 'warrantedly assertible'.) So Wright's complaint is that it may be warrantedly assertible that not-('P' is WA)
while yet it not be warrantedly assertible that 'not-P' is WA.
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Faced with the proof ll, however, he would owe us an explanation of exactly where it comes unstuck, when 'T' is construed as 'warrantedly assertible'. Which step, precisely, is at fault within ll on this construal?
'P' is WA DS not-('P' is WA) not-E
I
It cannot be the step of negation elimination. Nor can it be the step of negation introduction immediately thereafter. So it must be either the first application of DS:
or the second application of DS:
But Wright cannot be objecting to the first of these, since he writes that ...reason to regard a sentence as warrantedly assertible is, naturally, reason to endorse the assertion which it may be used to effect, and conversely (p. 18, my emphasis) So, to sustain his objection to the inference Q not-('P' is WA); ergo 'not-P' is WA.
he would have to demur at the final step C. of our little proof. But I maintain he cannot demur at this step, without begging an extremely important question against the anti-realist. We have to bear in mind that Wright is seeking a standpoint from which to make sense of the dispute between the realist and the anti-realist. He cannot, therefore, argue against deflationism on his way to defining or occupying such a standpoint if his argument involves, tendentiously, the premature adoption of a realist viewpoint. Precisely such a realist viewpoint is belied, however, by Wright's reluctance to grant the passage Q. That reluctance, we have seen, can only be founded on a refusal to grant the simpler terminal step Z of our proof. And, I maintain, refusal to grant this step can be justified only from the realist's standpoint. Wright is here imagining a proposition P which is falsificationtranscendently false, and whose denial 'not-P' is therefore not warrantedly assertible. He is lapsing into the view that the validity of this last step must consist in its transmission of verification-transcendent truth. So we have the rather interesting position where it is a realist conviction (however covert) that is leading someone (namely Wright) to refuse to grant an inference that any right-minded (not: Wright-minded) anti-realist takes to be valid. Usually it is the other way round! But the validity of the last step of our proof does not consist in its transmission of verification-transcendent truth. Indeed, it should (according to the anti-realist) consist rather in its transmission of warrant to assert. Looked at this way, if there is a warrant to assert the premiss not?, then 'not-P' is indeed warrantedly assertible! This is just a special case of the general principle that if there is a warrant to assert Q then Q is warrantedly assertible.
A warrant to assert not-P relative to our current state of information I consists of a disproof, or refutation, of P relative to I.
Consider now the kind of case that Wright was so concerned about: a proposition P with respect to which our current state of information I is neutral. That is, given our current state of information I we do not actually have at hand a proof of P; nor do we have a refutation of P. This by itself need not rule out the possibility that there be either a proof or refutation of P modulo our current state of information I. Such a proof or refutation of P may exist, and it may just be that we haven't discovered it yet. But I am prepared to grant Wright his alleged counterexample even on the assumption, in the thought experiment, that our current state of information I is genuinely inconclusive, and not just because we are being logically myopic within it. So let us assume, then, that P is genuinely undecided by our state of information I: there really is no proof of P from I, nor a disproof of P relative to I. We may even know this fact. Then Wright would indeed be able to assert not-(there is an I-proof of P); but this by itself would not warrant the assertion, in I, of For, to warrant the assertion, in I, of not? one would need to have a disproof of P relative to I. But precisely such a disproof is what Wright is assuming we lack! -for the state of information I is, ex hypothesi, genuinely neutral with regard to P.
We see, then, that Wright's thought-experimental counterexample does not even get off the ground in infirming the inference C not? 'not-P' is WA since it does not even warrant the assertion of the premiss.
But what about his imagined counterexample as applied to the inference against which the complaint was originally levelled, and for which we supplied the proof l 7 above? -O not-('P' is WA); ergo 'not-P' is WA.
Here one might be more easily seduced into granting the 'truth' -that is, the warranted assertibility -of the premiss while refusing to grant the same to the conclusion. But now we must ask: what exactly is the condition that has to be met in order that the premiss be warrantedly assertible (relative to our state of information I ) ? The answer is that we should have a disproof of 'P' is WA relative to our state of information I; not simply that we should at present lack a proof of 'P' is WA relative to I. Even if we possessed a (meta-)proof to the effect that the current state of information I genuinely left P undecided, that would still be insufficient to warrant the strong assertion not-('P' is WA)
All that would be warranted, in such a case, would be the weak assertion not-('P' is WA in I) But it would be a grave error to infer from this weak assertion the much stronger assertion that not-('P' is WA).
So once again, we see that Wright's imagined counterexample is no such thing; it fails to warrant assertion of the premiss of the inference that it was supposed to invalidate.
The source of the error is the non-constructive reading that Wright has visited upon the negation operator. To assert that P is to assert that there is a warrant for the assertion of P -hence the validity of the Disquotational Schema in the direction P 'P' is WA Likewise, to deny that P is to deny that there is a warrant for the assertion of P. The latter denial's warrant, in state of information I, must consist in a reductio of any assumed warrant, in any state of information consistently extending I, for the assertion of P. Note that we have to cover any state of information consistently extending I! It would not be enough, for the denial of P in I, simply to show that P had no warrant in I. Rather, one would have to show that P would give rise to inconsistency in any consistent extension of I.
So, let us look once again at the disputed inference O not-('P' is WA); ergo 'not-P' is WA.
which Wright thinks he has infirmed. To assert its premiss is to deny that 'P' is WA. This denial would be warranted only by showing that the assertion of 'P' is WA would lead to inconsistency in any consistent extension of our present state of information. But then so too would the assertion of P. Hence 'not-P' is warrantedly assertible. So the inference is valid after all. That Wright should have thought otherwise is evidence of just how insidious the prevailing mind-set of realism may be. One can forget all too easily that the price of denial is eternal inability to assert. 
